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Introduction
 This chapter looks first at the debate between two English philosophers of education, 
Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr. These professors differed on the need for educational 
theory or perhaps on the very nature of educational theory. Professor Paul Hirst, 
founder of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain and its honorary Presi-
dent, went on record to defend a robust version of educational theory in response to 
Wilfred Carr. This debate originated in a pre-conference workshop for students before 
the PESGB Annual Conference in Oxford in 2005. Hirst was responding to Carr 
whose attitude to educational theory had been chronicled in the Journal of Philosophy 
of Education over the years (See e.g. 17:1, 1983; 20:2, 1986; 21:2, 1987; 23:1, 1989). 
According to Hirst, educational theory responded to a crucially important need for 
conceptual clarification in our understanding of educational discourses and practices 
(2005, p. 618). Carr, on the other hand, had put forward the view that education does 
not need any kind of philosophical theory to underwrite it but should simply begin 
with educational practices, the practice of teaching, for instance, or the practice of 
learning this particular syllabus, or the pedagogy of using group work. Carr argued 
that education could derive its theory from these practices. There would be no need 
for higher reflection on concepts like ‘human freedom’ or ‘general enlightenment’ or 
‘the principle of democracy’ because education would be happy with the pragmatic 
reflections of workers in the educational field. 
The symposium had been organised in response to Carr’s paper entitled »Philosophy 
and Education« which had appeared in the Journal of the Society the previous year 
(38:1, 2004) and which gave rise to a number of follow-on articles. A philosophy of 
education requires some level of step back from practice and I interpret this debate as 
arguments for two distinct levels of theory. In my view, this tension also occurs in the 
debate about whether teacher preparation should best take place entirely in schools, 
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where student teachers might become apprenticed to an experienced teacher under 
the supervision of the school Principal or in programmes of teacher preparation gene-
rally managed by a University. Similarly, what role should the traditional foundations 
of education, namely philosophy, psychology, history, sociology, play in the formation 
of teachers? Carr voiced his opinion that perhaps continental philosophy would be a 
better context for the development of educational theory, referring to Rorty’s form of 
pragmatism as close to his ideal form of theory. Rather paradoxically I argue here that 
continental philosophy in the form of the disagreement between Husserl and Heidegger 
on the issue of pure phenomenology was also troubled by a very similar tension. 
There are arguments in favour of both sides.
Predictably, Hirst continued to defend ‘the critical and clarificatory function’ of philo-
sophy in the establishment of educational theory (1963, p. 51). He had held that all 
knowledge was governed by certain forms of logical organisation which he termed 
»forms of knowledge« by which he meant certain fixed fields of inquiry, certain fixed 
concepts mediating experience, such as mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, 
history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy (7 in all, 1975). He continued 
to argue for the preeminent role of philosophy as a keeper of conceptual boundaries 
and a keeper of knowledge in this sense, although he was to modify this stance in the 
1970s. Carr of the Sheffield School of Education remained more convinced by the 
salience of action research for teachers and hence refused to allow philosophy the 
critical role argued for it by Professor Hirst. 
The impact of this issue has refused to fade away. Indeed, one could argue that foun-
dational theory continues to be contrasted with the needs of practitioners in the field. 
What system is better placed to generate the theory that is to be taught to student 
teachers or nurses? Should we look to practitioners themselves or to the Universities? 
1. Degrees of Step Back from Practice
 Philosophy, in Hirst’s view, follows propositional rules and »pick(s) out the 
propositional nature of the achievements that are being pursued« (2005, p. 620). Its 
purpose is to »focus on certain abstracted aspects of the practices of education thereby 
subjecting them to rational critical scrutiny« (2005, p. 616). The purpose of the 
philosophy of education is to examine concepts, forms of justification and presupposi- 
tions made in these processes (p. 616, Hirst quotes and agrees with Peters 1966, p. 16) 
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1and, true to the empirical instincts of analytic philosophy, this concern divides into two spheres, the theoretical and the practical. While theoretical reason generates the propositional justifications of truth claims, beliefs, and knowledge in the domain 
of concepts, practical reason develops propositional justifications of actions in the 
domain of practice.
Hirst’s tidy account means that the purpose of the philosophy of education is to test 
the »rational validity« of certain first order »beliefs« or »practices« (2005, p. 618). 
Hence it is a »second order« activity. So, while these beliefs and practices belong at 
ground level within the domain of education, they are transformed by means of a 
propositional instrument into concepts that demonstrate themselves as coherent, 
warranted, robust, and valid. For Hirst, practitioners will never generate a comparable 
form of justification without the rigour of the propositional method, in short, 
without the type of »step back« theory that propositional philosophy provides, 
practitioners will not be able to understand clearly what they are doing. This »step 
back« from raw facts is governed by its own rules. This is a methodological requirement 
of the propositional form. Clark (2011, p. 48) may be right to say that propositional 
theory is not simply »reflection-on-action« (Schön,1984, pp. 61ff) and that action 
research is in a much stronger position to claim live relevance for a person’s thoughts 
and to promote reflection-in-action, given that they arise from experiences on the 
ground. However, this form of theory – ragmatic theory – is vulnerable to the charge 
of relativism and Bacon’s complaint about the Idols of the Theatre, where one draws 
theory out of one’s own substance (Smith, 2006). What Hirst objects to in Carr’s 
model is the assumption that non-professional philosophers are adequate to the task 
of generating a form of theory that would be comparable in philosophical rigour to a 
»philosophy« of education. He proposes instead that philosophy requires a rule-bound 
propositional method. Carr, however, objects that this demand is too excessive. Theory 
needs to avoid the bewitchment of language itself which might lead us perhaps to 
overstate the case, to claim clarity where none exists, to overlook blurred elements in 
the concrete space of inquiry that do not fit with the models proposed. Hence, in 
Carr’s view, theory in this higher sense has to be rejected and ultimately abandoned.
It is always tempting at this stage to take a detour through Greek thinking and to draw 
upon the good counsel of Aristotle as the inventor of practical theory or phronesis. 
This topic featured centrally in the original debate. However, as tempting as this might 
be (see Long, 2008), I am now inclined to agree with Hirst and to avoid this detour. 
I prefer to see Aristotle as largely marginal to the critical problem at issue, notwith-
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standing the ultimate role he might play in helping us to understand educational 
practices. The issue is really a political one between a properly propositional type of 
theory (Hirst) and a more practical type (Carr).
 
Hirst’s views on theory are vulnerable to the frame of all philosophical investigations 
as announced by Wittgenstein, namely, how bewitched we might be by our language 
(1972, p. 109). This bewitchment is centrally relevant to the current question (What 
has philosophy to do with education?). Even if, on the advice of Wittgenstein, clarity 
is less likely to be entirely possible in philosophy and we are fundamentally left with 
the philosophical reality »I don’t know my way about« (1972, p. 124.). If a particular 
way of using language (e.g., philosophical propositions) has become the road system, 
as it were, from the vantage point of which a landscape can be explored, we are inevi-
tably drawn to endorse the perspective of the landscape created by the road system. 
Similarly, the words we use, words like »subject« and »object« or »theory« and »prac-
tice«become milestones marking our passage along the road, periodic stopping places 
that apparently open up the landscape but also covertly conceal the particularity of 
our formal perspectives. Overlooked by these options for clarity is the prelinguistic 
landscape of experience or, if you like, the views from off-road, which of course are 
just as valid. If we took Wittgenstein’s warning to heart, we would have to conclude 
that »Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the 
end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything 
as it is« (1972, p. 124).
This observation is not good news for Hirst who is not happy to concede that philoso-
phy leaves everything as it is. Instead, for him, philosophical theory plays a particular 
role in framing experience and indeed curriculum. It provides these with their clarity 
and justification. Could this view be softened a little? Recent commentators have 
argued that some kind of softening might be achieved (Misawa, 2011; Noaparast, 
2013). But when Hirst says that »theoretical reason is directed to the achievement of 
theoretical truths, of propositions expressing in detached, objective, spectatorial terms, 
what is the case« (1972, p. 171), he names the function of theory itself and announces 
further that propositional analysis requires this degree of step back. He does not 
require a spectatorial view on any exaggerated cosmic scale but yet he supports a 
particular rule-bound step back from practice in order to generate a theoretical 
perspective (Clark, 2011). This analysis may indicate that different forms of theory-
making require different kinds of step back from practice but these all claim a certain 
propositional form. As Noaparast rather helpfully explains: »Hirst never denies that 
53hirst, carr and husserl: the problem of pure theory
1philosophy can deal with action, but claims that this dealing is indirect through a discourse that relates to action« (2013, p. 567). So what degree of step back qualifies as philosophy? Hirst’s position is that only a propositional form of step back counts. 
It is this strongly expressed propositionalism that causes worry for Carr, for it seems to 
exclude practitioners, as a general rule, the very people who should be encouraged to 
be philosophically engaged rather than summarily disenfranchised. The analytic trend, 
however, is always towards a propositional form of theory. Similarly, while Pring’s 
Philosophy and Educational Research values description, he also insists on the extrinsic 
character of concepts and beliefs that in some sense are »brought to« these observations 
(pp. 74-76). This is a trend in all analytic philosophy, but it causes Carr to object, 
arguing that both Hirst and Pring effectively attribute a similar kind of extrinsicism 
to theory itself, even if their positions claim to have been derived from the domain of 
practice. Instead of this, Carr prefers Stanley Fish’s expression, namely, that »beliefs 
are not what you think about but what you think with« (as quoted in Carr, 2006, 
p. 150). You can’t jump out of your own skin in order to think about yourself. So, this 
is an argument for a lower level of step back »theory« than is perhaps favoured by pro-
positional philosophy. However, Carr is also a propositional philosopher or at least en-
gages in its methods, which is the issue that confuses his version of an alternative to Hirst.
There are clear echoes of Dewey in Hirst’s position. In How we think (1910/1933), 
Dewey explained that in order to reflect, we must step aside from the flow of life and 
consider what has happened and what might happen in relative calm. This form of 
reflection could postulate an origin and an outcome and re-examine processes that 
otherwise would pass by too quickly. Hence, for Hirst, the purpose of the philosophy of 
education is to test the »rational validity« of certain first order »beliefs« or »practices« 
(2005, p. 618). While beliefs and practices belong at ground level within the domain 
of education, their description requires conformity with other laws at a logical level. 
They need to be demonstrated as coherent, for instance, relative to other claims, and 
since »in the exercise of theoretical reason propositional understanding is the sole 
concern« (2005, p. 628), it follows that a radical step back (or reflection in Dewey’s 
sense) to this form of discussion is required, pointing to the need to forge arguments 
governed by the rules of propositional logic. 
Carr is concerned, however, that such a strategy seldom supports the application of 
theory to practice with any conviction, quite simply because educational practices are 
caught in the flow of life and are not constrained in the same way by logical rules as 
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defined by propositional logic. To catch Carr’s sense, perhaps the example of studying 
wild animals in the zoo might be appropriate. It is like taking animals from the wild, 
putting them in a zoo and then studying their behaviour in the zoo in order to find 
out how they might behave in the wild. Once constrained by propositional rules, Carr 
argues, philosophical conclusions are radically out of place and clearly fail to have any 
impact either on the ground with practitioners or slightly off the ground with policy 
makers. Policy makers want to see relevant ideas before they will allow themselves to 
be convinced by coherent arguments. 
Now, Paul Hirst would suggest that philosophy has relevance for educational practices 
and is not entirely bound up with its own internal disputes. He supports a radical step 
back as this strategy operates well from a scientific perspective. Most scientific practices 
allow for several levels of step back from the experimental site. A physicist in the 
laboratory might want to step back in order to re-examine the efficiency of a particu-
lar piece of equipment. But this perceived solution to a problem might not be what is 
required. Perhaps it might be better to amend the experimental design itself. To find 
out if this is the case, the experimenter must be free to consider variables that are not 
yet manifest in the practice under focus, which might require some entirely new thin-
king on the practice and a new experimental design. In this case, a more radical step 
back from the experimental design offers greater practical success. What this shows is 
that a form of step back that is too close to the experimental site might be less success-
ful than one that might be several steps away. 
Another example of distant theory being more relevant than more proximate theory 
is the reality of demographic change in some schools. A sudden dip in pupil ability 
over a number of years can cause panic among seasoned teachers. While some staff 
insist on the return of customary practices to push forward the academic standards of 
pupils as a possible remedy for dipping academic achievement, others abandon this 
approach and prepare a more radical readjustment to the new conditions. What 
actions would make this school better? Because practitioners can easily accept quick 
solutions to problems based on their knowledge of the practice site rather than more 
considered ones that might follow from a broader scoping of the issues involved, 
superficial readjustments can follow too readily. What this shows is that theory close 
to the event may not be the most relevant kind of theory for resolving problems. 
So perhaps it is not the degree of step back that is at issue for Carr but rather its formal 
type. It is not the critical stance that bothers Carr but rather its formal stance. Thus an 
55hirst, carr and husserl: the problem of pure theory
1expression of anger could be effectively analysed in terms of the proposition that someone is angry together with descriptions of various behaviours that present evidence of their anger. As a clearer example, we might remember Searle’s phrase »I am going to 
do it« which could mean many things depending on the context in which it is delive-
red. What does it mean? One immediate response might be »but you can’t do that, 
think of your family« while another response might be »you said that before, why 
should I believe you now« while yet another might say »Oh thanks, that is very 
helpful«. After all, the phrase could house a variety of raw expressions, a »threat«, a 
»promise«, an »offer of help«, as Searle has noted. The form of the phrase itself does 
not say which of these meanings is more likely, but an altered tone of voice changes 
its actual meaning. For this reason, Searle argues that »there is no way of abstracting 
the locutionary act which does not catch an illocutionary act with it« (1973, p. 143). 
The relevance for our current argument is that it questions any claims to univocity of 
the propositional form. The child understands the illocutionary purpose of speech 
acts (i.e., their expressive force) long before achieving either semantic or grammatical 
control, even though his understanding might improve by means of further propo- 
sitional clarification, such as, »No Johnny, that man is not offering to help, he is 
threatening to blow his brains out«. It is quite possible from the context that the 
drama has been captured by the child already. 
Searle’s example simply presents some evidence that the propositional form is not as self-
sustaining as it might appear. What Carr denies is the belief that propositionalism 
provides a certain quality of logical precision that seeks to ground educational theory on 
practitioner beliefs and actions (2006, p. 137). Researchers of whatever persuasion 
cannot stand as neutral observers of themselves or their actions but are always embedded 
in the contingent norms and practices of their own historical perspective and in the per-
formative value of their actions. Language philosophy, however, does not have to be 
propositional but can extend to the critique of the propositional form, which is perhaps 
what Wittgenstein had set out to detail in his later work. Not being bewitched by 
language must also mean not being bewitched by its propositional form. While Hirst is not 
opposed to other forms of theory per se, he insists that the philosophical form of theory 
has to be theoretical in a stronger sense than perhaps warranted by performative logic. 
What are our conclusions, now that we have reviewed this debate? The critical ref-
lections on this debate have largely agreed that some middle ground is the only 
answer. In my view, at this time, this middle ground is closer to Hirst’s revised posi-
tion than to Carr’s. There is a need for the foundational disciplines to play some part 
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in the preparation of teachers and, more critically, there is a need for properly gui-
ded philosophical reflection in this preparation. Perhaps the propositional form 
might not be the best idiom for such a philosophy unless it takes into account the 
value of performative logic and the ordinary use of language proposed by Wittgen-
stein.
2. Relevance of the Debate to current University-School Links
 This issue is important in view of wider contextual queries questioning the value of 
University scholarship for professional practice. Just what kind of theory is possible for 
practitioners to tolerate?  Those of us engaged in teacher education constantly come 
up against this question from the perspective of practitioners. The trend is to reframe 
the professions by means of the slogan »Learn while you earn«. Such a policy nudges 
practitioners (according to the economics of the nudge) to follow an apprenticeship 
model in their early years of development and hence it leads them to accept as normal 
a form of theory that is necessarily ‘theory-light’. This trend favours policy strategies 
that highlight the fragility of University theory for such practical endeavours as tea-
ching or managing schools. Where possible, it endorses practical concerns and only 
tolerates minimal step back from the workface, with each step having to justify its re-
levance to practice. The less distant, the more relevant. Under these conditions, blue 
sky thinking is set at naught, as is any opportunity to review curriculum content in a 
radical manner. The preferred form of theory, if it is valued by its proximity to practice, 
is then confined to the reinforcement of field notes and whatever makes sense to wor-
kers at the coal-face. This is the form of knowledge that holds sway. It favours a stra-
tegy of keeping the boat closely tied at the quayside for fear that it might get lost on 
its travels. Otherwise can one guarantee that it will ever return to service the needs of 
practice?
Our universities today are charged with a difficult task. Academics move into areas of 
professional practice, and while learning from these contexts, they must also defend 
the texture of the critical value-set context from which they have been sent. These 
factors point to the need for a compromise between the providers of propositional 
(heavy) theory and the practitioner providers of surface theory. A tension impacts on 
the development of teachers, perhaps favouring the practitioner’s voice. The message 
is that whatever theory is to be offered to Newly Qualified Teachers must answer to 
the professional needs identified by practitioners, whereas all anecdotal evidence 
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1shows that established teachers at this stage want more wide-ranging, universal theory. These trends raise the question about the educational sector’s tolerance for forms of theory that operate at some remove from descriptive commentary. Perhaps a lesson 
might be taken from Plato. The theoros or ambassador mentioned in Plato’s Laws 
(952b) retains authority while remaining distant, by definition, from the lands being 
visited, and so exercises a theoretical function in respect of them. Athenian ambassa-
dors have to be sufficiently trusted by the society of which they are the emissaries to 
take on the responsibility for the integrity of its values while in a foreign setting. They 
can then be entrusted to remain sufficiently distant from the host society to exercise 
a purely theoretical function with respect to it. Universities have always embraced 
critique as their preferred form of theory and where they have engaged in curriculum 
development, they have done so on the basis of bringing a critical stance to bear on 
it. They act as a suitable counterbalance to the performativity imperatives of state 
systems. They have not in general followed the demands of currency alone (i.e., what 
is needed now) but have continued to allow for broader horizons that prove to be 
of considerable value to practitioners in the long run.
In the background of this question lies the relevance of University theory to the prac-
tice and theory of practitioners and, in particular, the relevance of philosophy to edu-
cational practice. While analytic philosophy seems to run into difficulties managing 
this problem due to its preference for propositional logic, could we then confidently 
state that continental philosophy with its preference for non-linguistic experience fa-
res any better? This is the question to which we now need to turn.
3. Pure Theory and Phenomenology
 While respecting Hirst’s view that »in the exercise of theoretical reason propositional 
understanding is the sole concern« (2005, p. 628), I need to suggest that other non-
propositional approaches, extending even as far back as the critical philosophy of 
Kant, present quite a different frame for philosophical reflection, but one that still 
ends up in a similar quandary with respect to the purity of theory. For Husserl, theory 
is required to »unify« empirical experience in the Kantian sense of unifying experien-
ce under a concept. Such a move opens a comparable distance between a transcenden-
tal understanding of the manifold (how the mind constructs the reality to be known) 
and other more spontaneous models of understanding.
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Brentano added a psychological element to the multiple manifestation of being by 
thinking of knowing as a movement, an action of engaged outreach toward objects in 
the world. Brentano is here following the reflections of Aristotle on the soul, arguing 
that to know is to grasp and therefore to move in appetitive capture of some event. 
Movement is central, the movement of the mind in its operation of knowing. Husserl 
refined this insight by describing the motility of the outreach of knowing in percep-
tion. He began to experiment with the language of »directing oneself towards some-
thing« (sich-richten-auf etwas) rather than the more static metaphors of picturing and 
representing that predominated in the neo-Kantian movement of that time. The term 
Husserl adopted from for this precise type of outreach is »intentionality«. For Husserl, 
every act of knowledge is intentional, meaning that it is not a representation (a picture) 
but an act of engagement. This feature is sometimes explained in phenomenology by 
saying that to be conscious at all in a human sense is to be conscious of something. 
Husserl was then able to focus on several aspects of prelinguistic conscious awakening, 
an approach almost excluded by picture theory, and was able to extend this reflection 
from a primitive level of simple apprehension open to pre-linguistic beings (like 
infants) to its conceptually enriched form among sophisticated users of language like 
picture-makers and proposition users.
Imagine two children engaged in a Maths problem. The Maths problem stands as an 
object in the world, a simple equation written down and composed within their 
ability range. But how does this object fit into the children’s respective worlds? What 
meaning does it have? What reality? It appears for the first child as something easily 
tackled, in no way an obstacle, so its being approaches the child as something positive 
and is welcomed. The child gushes at it on a wave of confidence that no problem is a 
match for his ability, a mere step in his forward passage to cover the course and make 
a success of his studies. For the second child, the same object appears against a back-
ground of dread. He is reluctant, fearful, remembering too acutely failures of the past. 
The same problem appears on a bed of doubt, making him nervous, fretful, stressing 
before what seems like an impossible task, lined up alongside other impossible tasks 
only too vividly impressed on the memory. The same Maths problem, the same object, 
but two different realities and two different worlds. So, when we come to examine the 
reality of the Maths problem like any object, we need to see it as part of an entire 
world in which the child operates as an elliptical centre, the child at one end, the 
object at the other. Guided by Heidegger, we can see that phenomenology primarily 
focuses on a particular field of consciousness that attaches itself to the object. The 
focus is on the being of what appears.
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1In Experience and Judgment, a book whose final text he approved but which was published posthumously, Husserl explains the active nature of human reception in any act of cognition. Using unfortunate phrasing, he could explain that the ego 
presupposes that something has been pregiven (an object) and toward this object 
perception has been directed (Husserl, 1973, p. 72). This is the origin of the thematic 
object which cannot appear unless it is both given and perceived. Hence the »substan-
tive« object becomes in a sense the identifier of a field which, as such, stands out and 
beckons for attention. Apprehension signals the motility of the entire cognitive appa-
ratus that engages with the object perceived by noticing it and maintaining its promi-
nence, one might say its meaning, by means of interest. The prominence of objects 
operates as a drawing power obtruding on the ego. Objects arise from within the field 
of ego awareness to confront the ego itself, beginning the process of ego definition. In 
this way, due to this dynamic interaction, an identity begins to stabilize as does the 
object in the field, which stands apart from or against the noticing act, having achieved 
prominence by means of it (1973, p. 77). Its ontological status (being) derives from 
its phenomenological prominence just as the ego’s own definition derives from this act 
of engagement. The learner enters a learning state at the same time as she enters an 
identity space by announcing an ego vulnerable to the act of noticing. 
In this way a prepredicative object obtrudes itself onto the learner by becoming part of 
his own perceptive reality, even if the »it« is not yet defined in its objective sphere or 
finished. Hence the object is touched, drawn into the mouth, licked, tasted, bitten, felt, 
returned and, when possible, thrown away. Just as the young child reaches out to grasp 
the object in this way, the intellectual instinct set in train by any intentional mood 
reaches out to grasp the idea of the thing. Paradoxically, the object is received in an 
active movement of grasping; something is brought close, toyed with, felt. As Husserl 
states, »receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity. The ego consents to 
what is coming and takes it in« (1973, p. 79). We remember the child who reaches out 
for what suddenly attracts her attention. We remember our own actions of curiosity 
when inquiring about some matter. The recognition that the object stands against the 
ego obliges inquirers to reach out and touch, to make contact with the object in ways 
that are available and perhaps to assimilate it in some way by exploring its sensory 
responsiveness. A »turning toward« takes place which Husserl arguably identifies as a 
striving (1973, p. 78) but also might be understood as active engagement. The inquiring 
mind is the reality itself, the reality of a frame or horizon of phenomenological insight. 
Intentionality allows a turning toward the item of prominence while the dynamic vectoral 
quality of human intentionality begins to solidify around objective and subjective poles. 
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It is strange then for the sake of rigour that Husserl sees scientific knowledge not as a 
form of theory emerging from the lifeworld (which his phenomenology demands) but 
rather as a form of theory based on justification fed by the transcendental realm of 
ideas. Theory occurs, as it were, at right angles to the line defined by intentionality. 
From particularities it is possible, by paying attention to the object concerned, to 
move back and upwards to levels of generality that unify the particularity under dif-
ferent levels of conceptual unification. This process might produce a taxonomy as 
Linnaeus suggested but it might reach beyond the biological realm also. So, if I learn 
that the animal is a dog, I form by abstraction a general idea of dogness which I can 
then use to identify other animals I have yet to encounter. I use this general or uni-
versal idea of dogness (a unifying concept) to help me identify any particular animal 
I may see. Dogness, however, does not exist in the world but only in mental systems 
generally. In other words, as I understand it, when the powers of classification develop 
along purely eidetic lines, they end up in essences that extend cognitively to constitute 
regional ontologies and ultimately certain recognisable scientific forms such as 
Chemistry, Physics etc. The formalism is the difficulty here. In the Lectures of 1925, 
Husserl distinguishes between the principles of logic by which things are understan-
dable at a scientific level (science = logic) and the empirical experience of things by 
which they are encountered and experienced (Erfahrung, Husserl, 1977). While 
Erfahrung (experience) refers to primitive encounter with things in the world, in the 
normal course of learning, things are rarely encountered without some prior historical 
understanding. They require transcendental readjustment and unification that gives 
them meaning, as Piaget would later demonstrate empirically. Husserl identifies this 
flexibility, the flexibility of experience, as an unhelpful blur that contravenes attempts 
to understand the world in a scientific or rigorous sense.
Hence »pure« phenomenology (as distinct from original phenomenology) studies the 
field as it detaches itself from the object as it manifests itself in its presenting world (re-
member the children with the maths problem) in order to promote understanding and 
clarity on the object itself. This move is comparable to Hirst’s propositional formalism, 
his step back into an indirect form of study. This latter orientation, in Heidegger’s view, 
drifts off from the original experience of the object and signals a singular fault in Hus-
serl’s approach (Heidegger, 1985, p. 107). On Heidegger’s reading, Husserl is engaged 
in the quest for pure theory by which is meant something similar to Kant’s transcen-
dental reduction. On the contrary, the whole meaning of phenomenology derives 
from our primitive encounter with objects in the world, holding them as objects of 
encounter because of their closeness to us rather than their distance, and certainly not 
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1cut off from the empirical by a set of rule-bound procedures. The attempt to find an a priori basis for consciousness is for Heidegger a step too far because the whole mea-ning of phenomenology is to describe the being of objects in the world. Because pheno-
menological orientation is continually enriched by categorial thickening and the peren-
nial influence of mood shifts and learning, evidence is seldom presented in an eidetically 
robust Husserlian sense and so purified phenomenology seems an impossible ideal. 
Although these matters are not quite as simple as I present them here, I have made a 
prima facie case for comparing Hirst with Husserl on the issue of ‘pure’ theory. Like 
the mathematization of reality, where numbers and shapes can be deduced from pure 
transcendental forms of numbers and shapes, Hirst’s insistence on the propositional 
form of theory tends to identify theory with transcendental logical features of thought. 
For Heidegger, phenomenological encounter operates in the same kind of field that 
Carr applauds. The objection to pure theory runs roughly parallel in both traditions 
and can best be understood as a battle between two formalisms. I argue here that the 
roots of this problem surfaced in the Hirst-Carr debate. The evidence presented as 
authentic to practitioners is arguably quite different from the evidence discovered by 
traditionally scientific but clearly more distant theoretical means.
4. Conclusion
 Hirst’s insistence that the role of philosophy is always indirect is linked to a concept 
of the purity of philosophical argument that is split off from the impurities of the life-
world. Husserl’s insistence on the purity of ideas promotes a method of eidetic reduc-
tion that cuts itself off from historical experience (Erlebnis). Certainly a field like 
chemistry is governed by an idea and governs in turn a territory, an arena of inquiry, 
a set of practices, but it is not clear how philosophy can operate as a gatekeeper for 
such a study. Carr’s insistence on the historical messiness of educational inquiry is 
intended as an indicator that education no longer needs the kind of foundationalist 
theory Hirst had proposed. Carr writes:
»  What my argument is intended to demonstrate is that educational practitioners 
cannot abstract themselves from this contextual setting and therefore always are, 
and could never be other than, rationally constrained by the epistemic norms and 
standards intrinsic to their shared discourse and practice (2006, p. 154).«
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Granted the validity of Carr’s postfoundationalist critique, if we are to consider the 
matter using a primitive strategy from tense logic, things might look different. Say if 
we were to ask which form of theory at time t1 —Hirst’s or Carr’s—we would prefer, 
then we would probably be more attracted by the robustness of Hirst’s form of theory. 
This is because in normal circumstances, we do not situate our perspectives or theories 
in their broad historical context but rather focus on how a matter should be under-
stood now, at this point in time, and for this we need some clarity of expression. Yet 
to be accurate about it, a timeless understanding is not available to us, as it might be 
of course to machines. Both the appetite for propositional clarity manifest in the 
analytic tradition and the ideal of mathematical clarity manifest in Husserl and 
derived ultimately from Descartes is only ever part of the story, perhaps even a 
distortion. 
As I understand it, Heidegger does not support indirect theory, nor anything similar 
to Dewey’s reflective step back from experience in order to consider the situation from 
a relatively safe distance. Philosophical thinking does not have the luxury of suspen-
ding time and even if reflection is possible, it is not offered as the type of step back 
activity imagined by Dewey. Reflection too is subject to the turmoil of life as many 
undigested features crowd in upon a person to distract and ultimately confuse the 
direction of the reflection. This simply means that reflective thinking is not best 
understood as a dispassionate event but is emotionally contextualised by the com- 
plexity of the agent’s encounter with things and problems.
Theory shows its etymological link to theos (god) and to theoros (ambassador). Theory 
makers need to define the distance they have travelled from their initial area of 
research. They need to justify the introduction of local rules — logic in the case of 
language, intuitive clarity in the case of a mathematical science —in order to define 
their form of study. However, this justification needs to respect the original species of 
encounter and area of research which is, as Carr says, in the middle of educational 
practices. 
Perhaps a doubt still hangs over the mind of practitioners about propositional theory. 
Perhaps the claim still lingers that such theory has become too pure and too far removed 
from the complexity of the many circumstances that contextualize daily practice. Per-
haps this explains why policy makers are tempted to return to the 19c pattern of 
apprenticeship for teachers and why there is a tendency to dictate to Universities 
which elements of curriculum should be selected and which left aside. But in these 
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1times of pressure, despite diminishing tolerance for forms of theory that operate at some remove from classroom needs, the need for critique and direction has never been more acute. There are features that cannot be googled and the need for critique 
requires taking an ambassadorial stance with respect to any particular practiced, 
including teacher preparation. Indeed, the work of the theoros or ambassador(s) in 
Plato’s Laws (952b) teaches this salutary lesson. It shows how »theoreticians« must 
defend their own value-set against any new ideas beckoning for their attention on the 
grounds of novelty alone. It shows how new ambassadors need to act as guarantors 
against the googled headlessness of our age and any ill-considered advice that might 
harm the integrity of the curriculum. Only from such a distance can theory propose 
novel actions that are mindful of a double duty, the duty to safeguard the coherence 
and justificatory value of what is proposed and the duty to read accurately the context 
of practice. 
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